already have industry are the most likely to attract more, placing Africa at a competitive disadvantage relative to other more industrialized economies.
Section 3 presents new evidence on changes in industrial structure and industrial product and export sophistication for 18 African economies between 1975 and 2005. It shows that since the 1980s industrial production in most African economies has declined in relative importance, diversity, and product sophistication. In contrast to most of the developing world Africa has "deindustrialized".
Section 4 takes up the how of industrialization. It outlines two broad areas for action. The first is the less controversial: continuing the investment climate reforms urged by the international financial institutions, but with increased emphasis on public action in infrastructure, skills and regional integration. The second is likely to provoke more debate: the need for industrialization strategies. These include creating an export push, spatial policies for industrial development, and attracting task-based production. Section 5 concludes.
GROWTH, FRAGILITY AND CRISIS
After stagnating for much of its post-colonial history, economic performance in Africa markedly improved after 1995. Between 1994 and 2007, average economic growth was close to 5 percent per year. Countries with at least 4 percent GDP growth constituted about 70 percent of the region's total population and 80 percent of its GDP. As a group, these countries grew consistently at nearly 7 percent a year from the mid-1990s to 2008.
In a series of papers Arbache and Page (2007 ) use a new approach to the analysis of "growth episodes" to examine the sources of Africa's growth turnaround. 4 They find that the improvement in economic performance in Africa after 1995 was due largely to two factors, a substantial reduction in the frequency and severity of growth declines in all economies and an increase in growth accelerations, primarily in mineral rich economies.
To assess the durability of growth Arbache and Page (2009) test whether there have been significant changes in such long run "determinants" of growth as investment, trade openness and macroeconomic stability during growth episodes before and after 1995. They find little evidence to support the view that significant changes in structural variables underpin more rapid growth. While Arbache and Page find evidence of modest improvements between 1975-1994 and 1995-2005 in some correlates of growth, such as foreign direct investment and trade openness, they fail for the most part to find significant increases in structural variables. The shares of total investment and private investment in GDP for example do not differ before and after 1995. Where investment did increase, it was confined largely to the resource rich economies. They also find little to suggest that better policies and institutions have spurred growth accelerations, although they appear to have been associated with fewer growth declines.
The weight of the evidence leads Arbache and Page (2009) to conclude that Africa's growth before the recent crisis was fragile. In resource poor economies this fragility is due to the main source of their recent success, avoiding the sharp growth declines --reflecting economic policy mistakes -of the past. Fewer economic mistakes allowed economies to return to their production possibilities frontier. Longer run growth will depend, however, on increased accumulation and productivity change, and Arbache and Page find little to suggest that these drivers of growth improved significantly after 1995. In the case of the resource rich economies fragility is directly related to the likely persistence the "resource curse". 5 The global economic crisis of [2008] [2009] has reinforced concerns over the course of future growth. Growth in Africa is expected to slow sharply from over six percent in 2007 to less than 2.0 percent in 2009, due to falling export demand, lower commodity prices, and much tighter external financing constraints. The prices of many African export commodities have dropped by 40 percent or more. In response to their own domestic fiscal pressures, some donors are under pressure to scale back official development assistance (ODA) on which many countries rely for balance of payments and budget support. Foreign direct investment is falling, particularly in natural resource sectors, and remittances, which represent a major source of foreign exchange for many countries and an important source of income support for many households, are expected to contract in 2009 (World Bank, 2009 ).
Those African countries that had achieved some success in diversifying exports have been hit hard.
6 Sectors such as apparel, food products, wood products and mineral products have come under heavy pressure. For example Ghana and the Ivory Coast -two West African, rapidly growing manufactured exporters -are heavily concentrated in food and wood products exports, which together account for more than 60 percent of their total manufactured exports. These two sectors are also highly (more than 80 percent) concentrated in high income markets and are likely to be strongly affected by the decline in high income country demand.
In sharp contrast with earlier economic downturns, however, African governments have worked to adjust to the crisis. To preserve macroeconomic stability many countries have significantly restricted their fiscal programs and a number have been able to protect some growth oriented expenditures. Better macroeconomic management is likely to mean that the growth declines will be less severe than those of the past, but the same structural weaknesses that made growth fragile before the global recession may also limit the region's prospects for recovery. For the vast majority of the region's economies, lack of economic and export diversity act as a powerful constraint on future growth.
WHY INDUSTRIALIZE?
Two strands of recent academic literature suggest that without a growing industrial sector Africa's economies will find it increasingly difficult to sustain growth and to participate fully in the recovery of global economic activity projected. The first links industrial structure to growth. There is a growing body of evidence that industry's contribution to growth depends upon its composition. The second links industrial location to firms' productivity. Geographical concentration has been shown to raise the productivity of firms, making it more difficult for economies where industry is sparse to compete with countries with large industrial agglomerations.
What Africa makes matters -diversity, sophistication, and structural change.
Two recent bodies of empirical work underpin the assertion that what Africa makes matters for its long run growth. The first shows that countries with more diversified production (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003) and export (Carrere, Strauss-Kahn, and Cadot, 2007) structures have higher incomes per capita. The second indicates that countries that produce and export more sophisticated products -those that are primarily manufactured by countries at higher income levels -tend to grow faster (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007; UNIDO, 2009 ).
Poor countries and -to a lesser degree -rich countries tend to specialize in a fairly narrow range of activities. Across a wide range of incomes, however, the diversity of what a country produces increases with the level of per capita income (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003) . The relationship between specialization in production and income per capita is not solely a product of structural change between primary production and manufacturing. Within the manufacturing sector new product lines are introduced and new activities are taken up within existing sectors until countries reach quite high levels of income. Other recent studies indicate that the same U-shaped relationship holds for export diversification (Klinger and Lederman, 2004; Carrere, StraussKahn, and Cadot, 2007) . As per capita incomes rise, exports diversify within existing product lines and through the introduction of new products. At OECD levels of income some export lines close down and exports become more concentrated, largely due to increases in the market share of existing exports.
Why should industrial and export diversity matter for growth? Structural change not only occurs between low productivity, traditional activities and modern, "industrial" activities but also within the modern sector, itself. Resources move from lower to higher productivity industries. One source of productivity gains may be that more diverse economies are better able to take advantage of export opportunities as they emerge. Evidence suggests that industrial diversity leads export diversity in fast growing economies (UNIDO, 2009) . This is consistent with the view that as the manufacturing base broadens economies build industrial competence, and firms enter global markets. If export opportunities can be successfully exploited, "learning through exporting" may take place, raising the productivity of the manufacturing sector as a whole. Another, complementary path may be that a wide range of industrial activities provides a basis for productivity growth through "churning" --the entry or expansion of more productive firms and the exit of less productive ones.
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Recent research (Hausman, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007; UNIDO 2009 ) has also found that there is a strong, positive relationship between the level of "sophistication" of a country's industrial production and export structure and its subsequent growth. 8 Rather than viewing technological complexity as an outcome of "moving up the production ladder" from relatively simple mass manufacturing activities such as textiles or footwear to increasingly more complex production processes such as metal-mechanical, chemical or electronics industries, this research measures the degree of sophistication of a product or export based on the per capita incomes of the countries that "intensively" produce (export) it. If mostly high income countries produce (export) a product, the associated income level is high and the product is classified as sophisticated; it is low for products mainly produced (exported) by low income countries. Countries that produce and export a high proportion of products that are mainly produced by richer economies grow faster.
The link between producing and exporting more sophisticated goods -measured in terms of the income levels they embody -and growth is again likely to be through changes in productivity. High income goods embody high income country productivity levels. These reflect some "narrow" aspects of technological sophistication, such as capital intensity or process complexity, but they also reflect broader capabilities, such as superior market knowledge, design, and logistics. All of these factors tend to contribute to higher firm level productivity. Low income countries with a high concentration of production and exports in higher income products are likely to have a higher concentration of high productivity firms. In addition as the manufacturing base shifts from lower sophistication to higher sophistication activities income levels may rise due to knowledge-based spillovers to the rest of the economy.
The UNIDO (2009) study represents a first attempt to link the two strands of the literature by looking simultaneously at the impact of both diversity and sophistication on growth. It finds that fast growing low and middle income countries both diversified and increased the sophistication of their production and export structures between 1975 and 2005. Slowly growing low and middle income countries in contrast were less successful at diversifying, and performed especially poorly in terms of increasing product and export sophistication.
Where Africa makes it matters -agglomeration economies
Manufacturing and service industries tend to concentrate in geographical areas, driven by common needs for inputs and access to markets, knowledge flows, and the need for specialized skills (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006) . Proximity to input suppliers and customers allows firms --including backward and forward linked industries -to 7 refer to this process as "self-discovery", firms learning what they are most competent at doing. 8 Rodrik (2007) and his colleagues argue that their econometric evidence points to the relationship running from greater complexity to growth. The relationship is robust to a number of specifications and treatments for two-way causality. UNIDO (2009) uses a different approach to address the endogeneity problem and arrives at similar results.
realize economies of scale and resolve coordination problems. Information spillovers, such as the sharing of technological, management, or marketing knowledge are enhanced when firms in the same industry are located near one another: it is easier to monitor what neighbors do and to learn from their successes and mistakes. Workers with specialized skills are attracted to areas where employers use such skills intensively and firms are attracted to areas in which there are a large number of workers (or managers) with skills relevant to their industry. Externalities from spatial concentration may arise from common skills and services (accounting, law) and from knowledge spillovers that are not specific to individual production technologies (Henderson, 1997; Jacobs, 1969; Nakamura, 1985) . Proximity may also provide better information about which entrepreneurs can be trusted, facilitating informal contract enforcement and cooperation (McCormick, 1999) .
Econometric evidence from advanced industrial and middle income economies supports the view that agglomeration effects are significant. Proximity to other firms has been found to strongly encourage entry and employment growth in agglomerations, due to productivity, price, or cost changes (Glaeser et al, 1992; Henderson, 1997 Henderson, , 2003 Combes, 2000) . Although the evidence is sketchy, it also appears that agglomeration externalities are important in low income countries (Bigsten, Gebresius, and Soderbom, 2008; UNIDO, 2009; JICA, 2009) .
It is likely that the source and size of agglomeration economies vary with the technological level of the industry concerned and with the per capita income of the country in which the agglomeration is located. UNIDO (2009) suggests that in low income settings where only a small share of the labor market is engaged in formal sector employment a thick labor market externality may provide the incentive for unrelated firms to cluster. In middle income countries the evidence suggests that closely related firms in more technologically complex industries reap the largest agglomeration effects, while in high income countries "urbanization effects" among unrelated firms appear to dominate, especially in information intensive activities.
Thus, countries with existing concentrations of industry are likely to have firm productivity levels that exceed those in countries where industry is geographically dispersed. Moreover, where agglomeration economies are significant, starting a new industrial location is a form of collective action problem. If a critical mass of firms can be persuaded to locate in a new area, they will realize agglomeration economies, but no single firm has the incentive to locate in a new area in the absence of others. Countries in which there are significant industrial agglomerations have an advantage in attracting new industry.
Africa's "De-industrialization"
The last two decades of the 20 th Century were boom times for industrial development in low and middle income countries. By 2000 the center of gravity of global industry was shifting rapidly to the developing world. Between 2000 and 2005, manufacturing growth in industrialized economies was only about 1 per cent per year; in developing economies it was more than 7 per cent per annum (UNIDO, 2009).
In stark contrast, the 1980s and 1990s were marked by a shift of manufacturing production capacity out of Africa. Africa's share of global manufacturing production (excluding South Africa) fell from 0.4 percent in 1980 to 0.3 percent in 2005, and its share of world manufactured exports from 0.3 to 0.2 percent (UNIDO, 2009). Today, Bangladesh alone produces as much manufacturing value added as the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa. Table 1 compares selected indicators of industrial development for Africa and all developing countries in 2005. The share of manufacturing in GDP is about one third of the average for developing countries, and in contrast with developing countries as a whole, it is declining. Per capita manufactured output and exports are less than 20 and 10 per cent of the developing country average, respectively. The region has low levels of manufactured exports in total exports and of medium and high technology goods in manufactured exports. Particularly worrying is the fact that these measures have changed little since the 1990s (UNIDO, 2009).
The decline in Africa's manufacturing base is worrisome in and of itself, but it has also been accompanied by a decline in the diversity of the region's manufacturing sectors and a fall in the sophistication of the products produced. Following UNIDO (2009) the sophistication of each ISIC three digit industrial sector is measured by the weighted average of the per capita GDP of all countries producing or exporting goods in the sector, where the weights are the export or production intensities of the sector in each producing (exporting) country (normalized to 1).
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From these it is possible to estimate the production and export sophistication of 18 African counties between 1975 and 2005. 10 Figure 1 plots the relationship between the sophistication of the manufacturing sector (on the vertical axis) and each country's level of development represented by per capita GDP (on the horizontal axis) for the earliest and latest years for which comprehensive data on African economies are available.
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Figure 2 repeats the exercise for export sophistication. The regression line indicates the cross-section 'average' level of manufacturing sophistication associated with a given level of development.
By the nature of its construction the country measure of sophistication shows a high positive correlation with aggregate per capita income levels. OECD countries cluster around the regression line in the upper right of the each graph. Countries substantially above or below the regression line are of considerable interest. Positive outliers produce goods more typical of countries at higher levels of income. Countries below the regression line produce goods that are less sophisticated than would be predicted by their levels of income.
Moving between the figures from earliest to latest traces the path of economic development and manufacturing sophistication for individual economies. The paths taken by such successful industrializing economies as Hong Kong (HKG), Malaysia (MYS), Singapore (SGP), and South Korea (KOR) move up and to the right in these figures, reflecting the positive correlation 9 Production intensity is measured by the ratio of the value-added share of the sector in a country's total manufacturing relative to the sector's value added share in world manufacturing. This approach is analogous to the use of revealed comparative advantage for exports by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) . 10 Country level sophistication is the weighted average of each country's individual product sophistication indices, where the weights are the share of manufacturing value added of each sector. 11 Because the indices of product and export sophistication are measured in current US dollars it is not possible to compare sophistication levels from year to year directly, since they are affected by price changes. The relevant comparison in the figures is the distance from the predicted relationship.
between per capita income growth and product and export sophistication. China and India stand out among the low income countries. Early on both economies had structures of manufacturing production that were significantly more sophisticated than those associated with their level of per capita income. In India's case, however, its manufactured export sophistication was more in line with predicted values.
The African economies in the sample are concentrated in the lower left corner of each figure. Figure 3 maps the average level of production sophistication between the 1980s and 1990s for the 18 African economies for which production data are available. Relative to predicted values, the sophistication of the manufacturing sector in 16 of the 18 economies declined between the 1980s and the 1990s, but the most striking thing about the Africa sample is how little change there is in either per capita income levels or product sophistication between the two periods. Only Botswana and Mauritius show substantial income growth, and in both cases their level of production sophistication is below that predicted by their level of income in the 1990s.
Botswana is an almost unique African case of successful development from natural resources. But, while per capita income has grown dramatically, there has been little change in the country's industrial structure, a source of concern to Botswanan policy makers, and a manifestation of the negative impact of natural resource rents on tradables production. Mauritius is sub-Saharan Africa's most successful manufactured exporter, and one of the region's fastest growing economies. The evidence that both product and export sophistication have declined, relative to income, in Mauritius since the 1980s suggests that the type of industrial transformation that has taken place in East Asia has not occurred in Mauritius. However, while there is evidence of a growth slowdown in Mauritius prior to the 2008-2009 crisis, it would be premature to conclude that the relative stagnation of the industrial sector in terms of product and export sophistication is the cause. Chile has been a rapidly growing economy over the same period with a similar pattern of low product and export sophistication. 12 The average production intensity for the country-product group is plotted along the vertical axis. The beginning point of each arrow in the figure marks the average production intensity for the country-product group in [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] . The tip of the arrow marks the average production intensity for the period from 1995 until the last observation, 2003 in the case of production and 2005 in the case of exports. A value of 0 -marked by the horizontal lineindicates that the average production intensity for the country-product group is equal to the global average. Production intensity indicates whether a country's production in a sector is more or less concentrated than the world average. Hence, changes in production intensity indicate whether an economy is entering or leaving a sector relative to the evolving structure of global production.
Figure 4 reveals how little structural change has taken place in African industry over a period of 25 years. The most relevant comparison is between Africa and the fast growing low income countries. Fast-growing low-income countries both diversified their manufacturing base and raised their level of product sophistication. They increased their production intensities at both the high sophistication, and especially, the low sophistication ends of the product spectrum. Indeed, fast-growing low-income countries were the only country group to increase the intensity of production in unsophisticated products significantly, driven by the explosive rise in the intensity of apparel manufacturing. Africa in contrast was virtually unchanged in terms of its intensity of production of low sophistication products and was exiting high sophistication activities. Its manufacturing base was becoming less diverse and at the same time less sophisticated. The decline in manufacturing sophistication was especially sharp in the region's early industrializers --Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia. Figure 5 repeats the analysis for exports. Here again there is little structural change and the contrast between the fast growing low income countries and the sample of African countries is equally stark. Fast growing low income countries increased export intensities in both low sophistication and high sophistication sectors, indicating increasing revealed comparative advantage in both categories of exports. The Africa economies in contrast modestly increased export intensities in low sophistication goods, but had virtually unchanged export intensities in high sophistication sectors. While fast growing low income county exports were becoming more diverse and sophisticated, African manufactured exports were becoming more concentrated and less sophisticated.
Putting the production and export stories together, what appears to have taken place in Africa during the 1980s and 1990s was a narrowing of the production base in manufacturing toward less sophisticated activities. This is consistent with the closure of non-competitive, import substitution industries -many of them state owned -following the trade liberalizations and privatizations of the adjustment period. At the low sophistication end competitive pressure was largely due to the rapid rise of other low income countries -mainly in Asia -as global suppliers of such products as clothing and footwear. At the high sophistication end African manufacturers were not able to compete with OECD and middle income developing country suppliers.
Those manufacturing activities that remained following trade liberalization, however, were more competitive internationally. As a consequence, exports of low sophistication goods increased somewhat as a share of total manufactured exports relative to global norms. That was the good news. The bad news was that, unlike all other groups of developing economies, Africa lost ground in high sophistication sectors, as export intensities stagnated.
In sum Africa has "de-industrialized" in two senses. First, Africa's structural adjustment in industry of the 1980s and 1990s was incomplete. There was little subsequent expansion of manufactured exports or output following the shake-out of inefficient producers after the trade liberalizations of the adjustment period. Private investment remained low, direct foreign investment was largely concentrated in mining and minerals, and despite some notable successes -cut flowers in East Africa; back office services in West Africa, garments in Madagascar and Lesotho -production and exports remained highly concentrated in a limited range of activities. Second, unlike more successful low income countries, Africa's manufacturing base in terms of both production and exports became less not more diverse and sophisticated, reducing the prospects for accelerated productivity change and growth.
HOW TO INDUSTRIALIZE
If industry returns to the development agenda in Africa, what policies are appropriate? The state-led, import substitution strategies of the 1960's and 1970s produced industry without efficiency. The distortions to the price system and the subsidies from the public purse were simply too great for the region's industrial enterprises to be sustainable in the long run. The adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s, however, produced efficiency without industry. Liberalized international trade benefited the consumers of industrial products, weeded out obviously non-competitive firms, and improved the allocation of investment, but Africa's industry failed to grow even in the product lines that remained competitive following the economic reforms.
Improving the investment climate
Reacting to the unsuccessful -and sometimes disastrous -results of Africa's early experiment with industrialization, policy attention since the mid 1990s -especially from the international donor community -has tended to focus on the costs of doing business. These have been well documented in a decade of comparative research sponsored by the World Bank and the World Economic Forum and summarized in the report of the Commission on Growth and Development (2008): much of the difference in industrial performance between Africa and other developing countries can be traced to differences in the "investment climate" --the physical, institutional and regulatory environment within which private investors make their decisions. 13 Overall, the cost of doing business in Africa is 20-40 percent above that for other developing regions.
The reform agenda for the investment climate has centered on economy-wide reforms in trade, regulatory, and labor market policies, designed to reduce the role of government in economic management. While perhaps necessary, these policy and institutional reforms have not been demonstrated to be sufficient to increase investment and growth, especially in the African context.
14 The Doing Business surveys, especially, can convey the erroneous impression that such stroke of the pen reforms as reducing the time and cost of opening a business or reform of labor legislation hold the key to more dynamic industrial growth. At a minimum the view of the investment climate needs to be broadened to encompass three critical business environment factors that constrain the competitiveness of industrial enterprises in Africa: infrastructure, skills and regional integration. 
Infrastructure
Firm level studies of productivity in Africa highlight indirect costs as a significant barrier to greater competitiveness. Efficient African enterprises can compete with Chinese and Indian firms in factory floor costs for some product lines, such as garments. They become less competitive because of higher indirect business costs, many of which are attributable to lack of infrastructure (Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran, 2005) . In China, indirect costs are about 8 percent of total costs, but in African countries they are 18-35 percent. Value-chain analysis identifies several choke points in the supply chain for African firms: high costs of import/export logistics, lack of timely delivery of inputs, and low speed to market (Subramanian and Matthijs, 2007) .
Sub-Saharan Africa lags at least 20 percentage points behind the average for low income countries on almost all major infrastructure measures. 16 In addition the quality of service is low, supplies are unreliable, and disruptions are frequent and unpredictable ( Table 2 ). Indicators of infrastructure access rose between the 1990s and 2000s but mainly in communications technology and water supply and sanitation. There appears to have been little strategic orientation of Africa's infrastructure investments to support industrial growth and little willingness on the part of Africa's development partners to finance infrastructure investments (World Bank, 2007a) . Road infrastructure has received little attention, and although concessions have been awarded to operate and rehabilitate many African ports and railways and some power distribution enterprises, financial commitments by the concessionaire companies are often small. Although access to communications services increased dramatically, thanks to the cellular revolution, high speed data transmission, critical to exporting lags badly.
Three closely related initiatives are needed to close the infrastructure gap:
• Changing public expenditure priorities to increase the share of the budget devoted to infrastructure investments relevant to industrial competitiveness; • Improving the quality of investment and service delivery, including by encouraging private investment and operation, and • Reaching new understandings with the international community on the need to change aid priorities to allow expanded public financing of infrastructure projects.
Skills
Lack of access to post-primary education has serious implications for efforts to build an African industrial sector. Recent cross country empirical research indicates that there is a strong empirical link between export sophistication and the percentage of the labor force that has completed post primary schooling (World Bank, 2007b) . There is also limited evidence to suggest that enterprises managed by university graduates in Africa have a higher propensity to export (Wood and Jordan, 2002; Clarke, 2005) . More broad-based evidence shows that among firms owned by indigenous entrepreneurs, those with university educated owners tend to have higher growth rates (Ramachandran and Shah, 2007 Declining educational quality at all levels is especially worrisome in view of recent research (Hanusheck and Wosmann, 2007) that suggests that the quality of education has a stronger impact on growth than years of schooling, after countries have passed a threshold level of average literacy and per capita years of schooling. Employer surveys report that African tertiary graduates are weak in problem solving, business understanding, computer use, and communication skills (World Bank, 2007) .
Creating new skills in Africa is likely to be both politically and institutionally difficult. In Africa's tight fiscal environments increases in secondary and tertiary education expenditures will need new agreements with international donors. Improving quality means confronting head on the prevailing curricula and teaching practices of both secondary and university faculties. Some elements of an approach to creating new skills include:
• Reaching agreement with Africa's development partners on a more nuanced measure of success in building human capital than the current primary education Millennium Development Goal.
• Encouraging private provision of educational services, especially in technical, vocational and tertiary education.
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• Strengthening the focus on educational quality. Quality assurance (QA) mechanisms -such as accreditation -are the primary means by which education systems achieve accountability for quality and relevance. Currently only 15 African countries have functioning education QA agencies.
• Using the diaspora. Africa is the region of the developing world in which the highly skilled form the largest share of all migrants. This "brain drain" can offer the possibility of a "brain bank" from which migrants are recruited to support skills development, through virtual, temporary, or permanent return.
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Regional Integration
The small size of Africa's economies and the fact that many are landlocked make regional approaches to the common problems that affect trade and industrialization --infrastructure in trade corridors, institutional and legal frameworks (customs administration, competition policy, and regulation of transport) and trade related services -imperative. For exporters in land-locked countries poor infrastructure in neighboring, coastal economies, incoherent customs and transport regulations -as well as inefficient customs procedures and "informal" taxes -in transportation corridors slow transit times to the coast and raise costs.
Tangible progress on regional integration to improve trade logistics has been slow. Investments in regional infrastructure are hampered by the technical complexity of multi-country projects and the time required for decisions by multiple governments. Progress has been greatest in regional power pools (in West Africa and Southern Africa). Institutional reforms -such as common standards, regulations, and one stop border facilities -have also failed to materialize.
Regional integration also matters for industrialization in Africa for a less well understood reason. Africa is made up of small countries and small countries have small cities. Big cities generate powerful agglomeration economies. A firm operating in a city of 10,000,000 people has unit costs around 40 per cent lower than if it operated in a city of only 100,000 people (UNIDO 2009). To overcome this problem a form of regional integration that permits the free movement of goods, capital and people across borders --allowing the formation of regional cities -will be needed.
Learning to compete
Investment climate reforms focus explicitly on the environment external to the firm. It is not surprising given Africa's past, sometimes disastrous, experiments with industrialization that African governments -pushed by the international development community -have chosen to focus on the business environment, but recently research has returned to an old theme with a contentious history: can firms learn to compete? 19 The new attention to what talks place within the firm is driven by empirical work that demonstrates that the differences in productivity levels between firms -even in the same industry -are substantially larger in low income countries than in high income countries. Thus, narrowing the gaps in total factor productivity across firms can translate into higher aggregate productivity and, ultimately, higher income levels.
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The debate about what, if anything, governments can do to increase firm level productivity is at the heart of the decades-long controversy over industrial policy. 21 What is often overlooked in the debate between "picking winners" and "leveling the playing field" is that governments make industrial policy every day via the public expenditure program, institutional and regulatory changes, and international economic policy. These choices tend -sometimes inadvertently -to favor some enterprises or sectors at the expense of others, and in Africa they often lack a 20 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for example show that these gaps are larger in China and India than in the United States, and that they have the potential to explain between a quarter and a third of the differences in aggregate productivity between the United States and China and India in the manufacturing sector. 21 The recent report of the Spence Commission on Growth (2008) concludes that the balance of the evidence suggests that proponents of selective industrial policies have failed to establish their general efficacy, but that some policy interventions have yielded positive results in individual country or institutional settings. 22 Rodrik (2007) ) makes a similar point. coherent strategic focus. For this reason, a first step for most African economies in learning to compete should be to deploy the existing arsenal of public policies toward three inter-related strategic objectives that can raise the productivity of the industrial sector as a whole.
Creating an export push
There is substantial evidence that African manufacturing firms improve their productivity by exporting (Soderbom and Teal, 2002; Milner and Tandrayen, 2004; Mengistae and Pattillo, 2004) . If the higher productivity levels of exporting firms are the result of their export activities -as might be the case for example in supplier-buyer relationships that involve the transfer of tacit technological or production knowledge -increasing the share of manufactured exports in GDP will generate higher levels of economy wide total factor productivity and more rapid growth. The alternative explanation for the higher productivity of exporting firms is self selection. More efficient firms are able to export while those with lower productivity confine themselves to the local market. Both hypotheses are plausible, and indeed, need not be independent of each other. More efficient firms can more easily access international markets, but they may still learn from exporting. The most recent econometric evidence suggests that learning by exporting is more likely to take place in smaller, poorer economies and in new, modern manufacturing and service exports, rather than in traditional, commodity exports. Bigsten et al. (2004) find that controlling for self-selection African firms enhance their productivity by around 9 percent per year if they export. Learning by exporters may also spill over to other firms located nearby (Bigsten, Gebresius and Soderbon, 2008) .
Africa has always had a relatively high share of trade in its national income and a high ratio of exports to GDP. However, African exports, particularly non-oil exports, are growing slowly, and in sharp contrast to the case of China and Asia's other top performing countries, exports are not growing as a share region's output. Of perhaps even greater concern, they are declining in importance for Africa's fastest growing economies. Africa's share of world trade is falling, and its exports remain heavily concentrated in a few traditional commodities.
The public policy implications of learning by exporting are straightforward but powerful: if productivity improvements in industry are linked to learning through exports, an "export push" strategy, involving a concerted set of investments, policy and institutional reforms to promote manufactured exports can boost competitiveness and raise growth. While Africa has made some progress in each of these areas, it has not made sufficient progress to create an environment conducive to the rapid growth of non-traditional exports.
At the border policy reforms are the most advanced. Trade reforms have brought tariffs down in Africa, and its trade regimes discriminate against exports to about the same degree as those of other regions worldwide. Countries with flexible exchange regimes now account for about 76 percent of Africa's GDP and 68 percent of the region's population. While there remains scope for further rationalization and liberalization of tariffs, it is unlikely that Africa's lack of export dynamism derives from anti export bias in the trade regime.
Beyond the border, surveys of manufacturing firms in African countries highlight -in addition to the obvious deficiencies in infrastructure -a number of areas in which regulatory or administrative burdens impose penalties on exporters (Clarke, 2005; Yoshino, 2008) . Enterprises involved in exporting are more likely to identify trade and customs regulations as serious obstacles to doing business. Port transit times are long. Customs delays on both imported inputs and exports are significantly longer for African economies than for China or the Philippines. Export procedures -including certificates of origin, quality and sanitary certification, and permits -can also be burdensome. Duty drawback and tariff exemption schemes are often complex and poorly administered, resulting in substantial delays.
Creating an export push will require coordinated action across a wide range of government actors to succeed:
• Transport, power and communications infrastructure aimed at international markets are essential elements of an export push. National budgets will have to assign priority to trade related infrastructure, and, given the high costs associated with these investments, encouraging private participation will be essential.
• Streamlining export promotion activities -from customs administration to export promotion agencies -and making them more efficient and accountable to exporters has been a key component of the export push strategies in economies as diverse as Korea and Ireland. In Africa these institutions generally operate in an uncoordinated way with few lines of communication to the private sector.
• In the area of trade logistics -a key determinant of export performance -infrastructure deficiencies interact with poor public institutions and lack of competition among service providers to create a vicious circle of constraints to the efficient movement of goods and services. Trade logistics reforms need to move beyond the traditional "trade facilitation" agenda -focused on trade related infrastructure and information technology in customs -to broader reforms of institutions and transportation and service markets along the supply chain.
• "Open regionalism" -using trade agreements to support international competitivenessshould be a key objective of regional integration. Most regional agreements in Africa are dysfunctional. There is an urgent need to rationalize the overlapping mandates of Africa's sub-regional organizations and to focus them on open regionalism.
Africa's success in boosting non-traditional exports may, however, ultimately depend as much on the actions of its international partners as on its own efforts. Aid agencies will need to support strategic investments in trade related infrastructure and institutions, mainly under the aegis of the WTO "Aid for Trade" initiative. In addition more advanced economies can reduce escalating tariffs directed at higher stage processing of Africa's commodity exports and could offer a measure of trade preferences for its non-traditional exports.
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Encouraging industrial clusters
Compared with Asia, Africa has few industrial clusters, making it more difficult for African firms to compete in the global market place. Because locating near other industrial producers raises the productivity of firms, policies to encourage the formation of industrial clusters may be another way of helping African firms to boost their competitiveness. But, since the evidence on agglomeration economies in developing countries is quite thin, efforts to support existing clusters or to create new types of clusters need to be approached with caution. Industrial agglomerations are the outcome of decisions by individual firms, and policy makers need to be careful to work with the market, not against it. In fact the most import policy tool to help realize agglomeration externalities in many countries may be to get rid of urban zoning and land use policies that make it costly or impossible for firms to locate near each other.
Given the low level of industrial export dynamism in most of Africa, linking export promotion and spatial policies in an export processing zone (EPZ) may be an attractive way of encouraging agglomeration. The early motivation for EPZs was to provide a so-called "free trade environment" for exporters and to attract outward-oriented foreign investors. Most of the literature on them, therefore, has focused on their role as a substitute for or complement to trade liberalization. Cost-benefit analyses of the performance of export processing zones (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Warr, 1987 Warr, , 1989 Warr, , 1993 conclude that they are of marginal value as export promotion tools. From the point of view of spatial industrial policy, however, the main drawback of these studies is the lack of focus on agglomeration economies.
In thinking about the spatial dimensions of EPZs it is important not to confuse their potential role in industrial development with trade policy objectives. It is possible to have a free trade environment for exporters without having them located near one another, through such mechanisms as bonded warehouses, duty draw back and temporary admissions schemes, or complete trade liberalization. It is also possible to encourage industrial agglomerations without providing a special trade regime. The main benefit of an EPZ is that it provides a clear focus for government investments and institutional reforms designed to encourage the location of firms in a specific area, and it is also subject to an efficiency test --firms located in the cluster must be able to export.
Africa has few functioning EPZs (Madani, 1999) . Most fail to attract a sufficient number of firms to realize cluster economies, and in many cases they offer excessive subsidies to the few firms that they succeed in attracting. Often in Africa EPZs have been designed and run by bureaucrats who have no experience in business. Delays are common and service levels are low, leading to client frustration and losses. Communications between clients and public managers are often strained, and in some cases corruption further erodes business confidence. Making the physical and institutional investments to create world class export processing zones should be a priority strategic objective of learning to compete.
The critical public investment question is how much to invest in the physical and human capital of a given location and how much of the costs to recover. Case studies suggest that concentrating investment on high quality infrastructure in a limited physical area is crucial. They also suggest that improving social services in an industrial zone to levels above national standards is highly desirable. Despite the export rule it is possible to subsidize firms in an EPZ cluster excessively. This occurs mainly through low levels of cost recovery on infrastructure and other public services, rent subsidies and tax holidays. Seeing an EPZ as an industrial cluster raises the risk that governments may impute too many benefits to spillovers. Because we know very little about the magnitude of the agglomeration economies that may come from an EPZ, any public subsidies should be based on the quantifiable impact of the zone on employment and output.
Attracting trade in tasks.
In some manufacturing activities the production process can be decomposed into a series of distinct steps, or tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006) . As transport and coordination costs have fallen, it has become efficient for the production of different tasks to be located in different countries, each working on a different step in the process. Task based production has expanded dramatically in the past 20 years. In 1986-1990 imported intermediates constituted 12 percent of total global manufacturing output and 26 percent of total intermediate inputs. By 1996-2000 these figures had risen to 18 percent and 44 percent respectively. Exports use a substantially higher share of imported intermediate inputs than production for the domestic market: a ratio of about 2 to 1. Moreover, the import intensity of export production rose from about 67 percent in 1986 -1990 to 78 percent in 1996 -2000 (UNIDO 2009 ). East Asia is by far the region of the developing world that has the largest volume of task based production and trade, much of it taking place within the region itself (UNIDO, 2009).
We know almost nothing about the extent and characteristics of task based production in Africa. Certainly, it exists, and the relatively liberal rules of origin under the Africa Growth Opportunities Act of the United States (AGOA) have encouraged final assembly operations in clothing manufacturing in counties such as Lesotho and Mauritius. Africa has a high volume of imported intermediates in total intermediates and in total output, but given its limited range of manufactured exports these intermediate imports are likely to be primarily inputs into production for the domestic market.
One simple way of attempting to identify countries in which task based trade is significant is to compare per capita values for gross manufactured exports and manufacturing value added. The more vertically integrated an export activity the closer these values should be.
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Where assembly type operations predominate, gross manufactured exports per capita should be substantially larger than manufacturing value added per person. For the average African economy exports per person at $ 39 are substantially less than manufacturing value added per person ($ 64), indicating that there is little in the way of task based production. Comparisons with four rapidly industrializing economies that have used task based production extensively -two in East Asia and two in Central America -show the extent of difference in these relationships. In each of the comparators the ratio of manufactured exports per capita exceeds the level of value added per capita by a substantial margin. In the cases of Cambodia and Vietnam the ratio is about 2:1. By this standard only seven African economies appear to have some task based industry. In each economy the ratio of manufactured exports per capita to manufacturing value added per capita exceeds unity and ranges from 14:1 in Botswana to about 2:1 in Cote d'Ivoire. Interestingly, Lesotho and Mauritius, two countries that have used the AGOA preferences extensively for market access of tasked based apparel production, have ratios that are quite similar to those of Cambodia and Viet Nam.
For countries that have failed to industrialize task-based production is a potential lifeline. It is easier to specialize in a single task than in the entire range of tasks needed to produce a product. End stage tasks are highly mobile, and African economies can benefit from this mobility through concerted programs of investment promotion, provision of infrastructure and improvements in the investment climate. For Africa a logical place to begin the effort to attract task based production is in export processing zones.
Trade in tasks has amplified the importance of trade logistics. Increases in the logistics costs for intermediates raise the cost of the final product, and in task based production high shares of intermediates in final output mean that the effect of changes in transport costs is magnified. Countries at the final stages in the production chain of a task-traded good are unlikely to be competitive if their trade logistics costs on imported intermediates are high, and countries hoping to enter upstream in a global value chain cannot afford to have high trade friction costs for their exports. Beyond cost, timeliness and the predictability and reliability of supply chains are increasingly important in a world of just in time production sharing.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper began by asking whether and how Africa should industrialize. The answer to whether to industrialize is relatively simple: for the vast majority of the region's economies lack of industrial and export diversity and sophistication act as a powerful constraint to growth. The answer to how to industrialize is more complex. Undoubtedly, improvements to the investment climate -the physical, institutional and policy environment within which firms operate -are still needed. Public policy to improve the investment climate, however, needs to shift from a focus on stroke of the pen changes to regulations to embrace public action to close the infrastructure gap, create new skills and achieve meaningful regional integration.
Beyond the investment climate, Africa's enterprises must also learn to compete. Here the role of public policy is more controversial. Africa's past experiments at industrialization have been largely unsuccessful, and there has been a tendency to dismiss the idea of industrial policy as inappropriate or unworkable in Africa. This ignores of course the fact that governments in Africa implicitly make industrial policy every time they make decisions with respect to public investments, regulations or trade policy. What is often missing is a coherent, strategic view of how these public actions can be combined to accelerate the region's industrial transformation.
There is a role for active government in helping firms learn to compete. At the most basic level what is needed is a strategic use of existing policy instruments to increase the likelihood that firms in Africa can develop more competitive capabilities. Creating an export push, supporting industrial clusters, and attracting task based production offer an opportunity to give Africa a new start on industrialization. The vertical axis represents the logarithm of production intensity, such that a value of zero indicates world average intensity. A value of 0.5 (1) is equivalent to 165% (265%) of world average, while a value of -0.5 (-1) equates to 61% (37%) of world average intensity The horizontal axis is the Sophistication Index for productive sectors, which attaches a representative income value to each of the 28 manufacturing sectors. Our division between low-and high-tech is based on the sector rankings presented in UNIDO (2009) . The relatively more "high-sophistication" division is made up of the Fabricated Metals (381), Machinery (382), Electrical Machinery (383), Transport (384), Equipment (385), Furniture (332) and Printing & Publishing (342) sectors; the relatively more "low-sophistication" division is made up of the Food (311), Beverages (312), Tobacco (313) Textiles (321), Leather (323), Footwear (324) and Rubber (355) sectors.
